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Summary 
The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an 
asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal 
endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the 
effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set up 
captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that 
reforms toward higher powered rules are more likely the more inefficient (efficient) is 
the production (information-gathering) technology, the less tight is political competition 
and the greater are pro-consumer supervisors’ incentives. This prediction is consistent 
with evidence based on US electric power market data. 
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In regulating a natural monopoly with unknown costs, governments should 
select incentive rules optimally trading off informational rents extraction and cost- 
saving inducement (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Yet, politicians put a greater or 
lesser weight on the firm’s profit depending on whether their constituency is 
dominated by pro-shareholder or pro-consumer sentiments. Besides, the details of 
incentive contracts are designed by public officials who are accountable either to 
professional peers or to specific groups of voters and not to the society at large. 
The US electric power market (along with other US markets) is a case in 
point. Major regulatory reforms, included the recent introduction of incentive 
regulation, are politically initiated but subject to lengthy quasi-judicial hearings 
aimed at gathering both the necessary technical information and the consensus of 
all interested parties. While regulators and judges, who can either be appointed or 
elected, preside over the hearings, the final policy position is proposed de facto by 
an independent staff. This institutional design is not unique to the US and, in the 
aftermath of the recent South-American and European privatization wave, a rising 
need for higher transparency of the regulatory process has exported beyond 
American boundaries a similar combination of independent staffs and accountable 
top-level regulators and judges (see Newbery, 2000).
1 How, therefore, do public 
officials’ incentives and task-specific motivations shape regulatory reforms and 
                                                 
1Remarkably, the Competition Act of 1998 and the Utilities Act of 2000 reformed the UK gas and 
electricity market institutions introducing a top-level board of three officials (GEMA) appointed 
by the Secretary of State and supported by an independent staff (Ofgem). The latter proposes the 
policy position and is subject to a strict transparency requirement which, in turn, “provides the 
hook for judicial review” (OECD, 2002).    3
how does this mix of incentives and motivations interact with the rent extraction-
efficiency trade off and the political environment?  
To answer these questions, I provide a theoretical framework bridging the 
canonical principal-agent model of incentive regulation (Laffont, 1996) with two 
recent strands of political economics literature. While the first one compares 
accountable and non-accountable public agents (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007 and 
2008), the second contrasts career and legacy concerns in politics (Maskin and 
Tirole, 2004). Bringing together these bodies of economic theory, I study the 
incentive rules selection problem performed by a principal faced with a monopoly 
with unknown costs. The principal is endowed with an information-gathering 
technology whose efficiency rises with the effort exerted by a regulator and a 
judge, whom hereafter I will call supervisors. Supervisors respond to implicit or 
accountability incentives and intrinsic or legacy motivations. Implicit incentives 
force supervisors to select effort looking at the ballot box (at the preferences of 
their professional peers) if elected (appointed) but not at the power––in terms of 
cost reducing effort––of the rule selected by the principal.  
The model predicts that, under a mild condition on the distribution of 
supervisors’ random abilities, elected supervisors exert more effort than appointed 
ones. These pro-consumers selection incentives are fuelled (curbed) by judges’ 
fairness motivations (regulators’ desires of pursuing a career in the industry). The 
principal foresees the effect of implicit incentives and intrinsic motivations on the 
expected probability of remaining uninformed, and, accordingly, the power of 
equilibrium incentive rules increases (decreases) with fairness (revolving door) 
motivations, and is greater when supervisors are elected. Also, if the principal is 
concerned by the long run efficiency of the market, the power of the optimal rules   4
increases (falls) with the efficiency of the production (information) technology. 
Finally, if the principal is one of two competing parties, incentive rules are also 
sensitive to tightness of political competition and to voters’ preferences. 
To test this set of predictions, I analyze US electric power market data at 
the state level. Consistently with the model, performance based regulation (PBR 
hereafter) is found where regulators and judges are elected, political competition 
is less harsh, generation more costly and regulatory resources more abundant.  
There are three main contributions by this paper. First, I formalize and test 
a theory of complementarities among supervisors’ implicit and firms’ explicit 
incentives arising endogenously from the contractibility of the firm’s allocation as 
opposed to the non-contractibility of supervisors’ performance. I also offer one of 
the first accounts of the relation between public officials’ intrinsic motivations 
and regulatory policies (see also Ka and Teske, 2002; Guerriero, 2008).  
Second, I provide evidence that the observed regulatory institutions reflect 
both efficiency and strategic political concerns. This is particularly noteworthy 
because, even if several studies have used cross-state telecommunications (see Ai 
and Sappington, 2002; Eckenrod, 2006) and cross-country electricity data (see 
Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001) to show that PBR can deliver lower rates and higher 
profits, no previous paper has tried to evaluate the determinants of reforms toward 
incentive regulation.
2 Finally, I also propose a first test of the endogenous effect 
of incentive rules on US electricity rates using a GMM estimator. This last 
                                                 
2 Recent empirical tests look at the determinants of electricity market restructuring experiences in 
the US (Ka and Teske, 2002) and around the world (Steiner, 2004) but without providing a formal 
theory of regulatory actors’ incentives as derived by market institutions. Hanssen (2004) provides 
a first empirical result bridging strategic dynamics and institutional reforms.   5
exercise shows that rates are unaffected by PBR and suggests an investment-
based explanation of the incentives revolution, stressing also the relevance of an 
endogenous regulatory institutions research program for policy evaluation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutions governing the pricing process in the US electric power market. The 
first part of section 3 clarifies the effect of supervisors’ incentives and motivations 
on incentive rules. Next, the benevolence assumption is relaxed and the strategic 
determinants of regulatory reforms are evaluated. Section 4 tests the model’s 
implications, looking at the wave of reforms toward PBR that has interested the 
market in recent decades. Section 5 concludes. All proofs, tables and a detailed 
description of the data are gathered in the Appendix. 
 
2. Institutions 
Natural local monopolies and incentive rules.––Investor-owned electric power 
utilities (IOUs hereafter) account for over three-fourths of the electricity sales of 
the US electricity market. While jurisdiction over both interstate transmission and 
wholesale transactions lies with a federal body––the FERC, retail services are 
regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs hereafter). The latter deal 
with several markets (natural gas, telecommunications, insurance, water, etc.) and 
perform several tasks (for example, they suggest lines of conduct on service 
provision, design environmental regulations and so on), among which price-
setting is the most relevant. IOUs are not allowed to receive government subsidies 
and, therefore, regulated two-part tariffs should cover average costs to assure the 
firms’ viability. Accordingly, rates have traditionally been linked to realized   6
average costs (cost-of-service regulation). Yet, from 1982 on, incentive rules have 
been applied to forty-one among the 144 major US IOUs, partially severing the 
price-average costs link (Basheda et al., 2001).  
Two-tier hearings and supervisors’ roles.––Reimbursable costs and target returns 
are selected during rate reviews which can be triggered by utilities in response to 
cost shocks, initiated periodically by the PUC (see Friedman, 1991) or, often, 
required by the state government in order to assure that a particular rule is 
implemented.
3 Rate reviews follow a precise routine composed of two levels of 
formal quasi-judicial hearings open to all interested parties (firms, ratepayers 
along with state-funded advocates, interest groups, etc).
4 First, commissioners––
the head of the PUC––sit on the bench; next, if the filing is not approved or some 
party finds herself mistreated, a High Court judge (usually sitting in a state 
supreme court) is asked to rule the case. The appeal is on law and fact and “with 
so much at stake, [judicial review] is a very real possibility” (Gormley, 1983).
5  
During the hearings, the role of commissioners and judges is one of 
supervision. They examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and 
interpret prevailing precedents and regulations. The final motion to be approved, 
however, is proposed de facto by the PUC’s staff, who acts as the jury in the 
                                                 
3 As Lee and Hill (1995) report, the 1995 Maine Alternative Rate Plan was introduced under the 
thrust of several laws (e.g., 1988 Least-Cost planning) approved by the Republican legislature. 
4 I follow Friedman (1991, pp. 92 – 98), CDRA (1992, pp. 52 – 68) and Gormley (1983,  pp. 92 – 
98) whose overviews are highly consistent with those available on the PUCs’ websites. 
5 A huge body of press testimonies and empirical evidence highlights the critical role of judicial 
review. The appellate rate of PUC decisions reached between 1974 and 1979 the mean level of 
37.4 percent with a peak of 52.3 percent and a share of partially reversed cases of 43.5 percent 
(Gormley, 1983). Teske et al. (2004, ch. 15) report similar figures for the 1995-1996 period.    7
typical Anglo-American adversarial trial.
6 The reason is that decisions should 
always be reached in “an open and fair manner” (CDRA, 1992).
7 This feature, 
along with the fact that the complete record of the hearings is widely publicized 
and all interested parties participate, assures that only if “hard” evidence––such 
that “every interested party can convince himself that [the judgment] corresponds 
to the true state of the world” (Laffont, 2000)––is obtained does the review end.  
Accordingly, I set up a model in which incentive rules are selected by a 
planner obtaining orthogonal and truthful signals on the firm’s technology. The 
precision of these signals increases with the effort exerted by a regulator and a 
judge. If benevolent, the planner represents a fiction for the Coasian bargaining 
among interested parties necessary to implement a reform. If partisan, a major 
emphasis is placed on political competition. 
Supervisors’ incentives.––Media carefully track the evolution of electricity files, 
which, in turn, represent some of the most advertised tasks over which regulators 
and judges are selected. High court judges and PUC commissioners are either 
elected or appointed. Coherently, I assume that supervisors are rewarded on the 
basis of the extent of hard information (reported in the docket official papers) they 
obtain during the hearings. Besides, I explicitly model the role of selection rules 
and of regulatory and judiciary specific motivations in the pricing process. 
                                                 
6 “The judge just listens attentively. If it speaks, it will be to rule, at the request of the party or on 
his own motion, on the admissibility of a question put to a witness or a party or to ensure 
adherence to the rules of the game”(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, pp. 272 – 273). 
7 Commissioners consider the staff as the most influential hearing actor (Gormley, 1983; Ka and 
Teske, 2002). While a part (trial staff) suggests a pre-hearing position, another (advisory staff) 
proposes the final motion (CDRA, 1992). Furthermore, courts usually examine the staff before 
issuing the judgement (Gormley, 1983).   8
3. Theory 
The model takes its approach from Laffont and Tirole (1993), and includes 
a planner and two implicitly and intrinsically motivated supervisors. 
 
3.1 Preliminaries 
Preferences and information.––The regulated firm produces a variable scale 
product  q, charging a two-part tariff  A pq +  with q,  A and  p strictly positive. 
The total cost is  () Ca q c q β =− = where  0 a >  is the manager’s effort and  0 β >  is 
an inefficiency parameter which is equal to β  with probability v and to β with 
probability 1 v − . Define  0 βββ ∆≡ −>. Effort a lowers the marginal cost c of a 
and implies a disutility (in monetary units) for the manager of  ( ) a ψ  with  ( ) 00 ψ = , 
() lima a βψ → =∞,  0 ψ′> ,  0 ψ′′ >  and  0 ψ′′′ >  (this last assumption assures that the 
optimal incentive rule is deterministic). 
Consumers share the same preferences, and the demand is that of a 
representative consumer. Let  ( ) Sq, ( ) ( ) pP q S q ′ ==,  ( ) qD p =  and  ( ) ( ) R qP q q A =+  
label the gross surplus, inverse and regular demand functions, and the firm’s 
revenue. Consumers choose q in order to maximize the net surplus  () Sq A p q −− , 
and  A is fixed optimally to make them indifferent between buying or not the 
good: that is,  A≡ ( ) ( ) Sq Pqq − . The firm’s utility is  ( ) Ut a ψ =− , and a reservation 
level of 0 is required. Finally, total revenues must cover costs and managerial 
rewards t; therefore, the budget constraint  ( ) ( ) A pc q p t + −≥  needs to be satisfied. 
The planner’s problem.––Ex post social welfare W  is the sum of the net 
consumer surplus and of the firm’s utility. The firm’s budget constraint is   9




() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 W Sqp A p qp U A p cqp t λ =− − + + + + − − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦.                                        () 1  
Let  () Vq denote the social surplus brought about by the production of q. Given 
that the good is private, V  is the sum of the consumers’ net surplus plus the 
firm’s revenue, computed at the shadow price 1 λ +  (because it helps to fulfil the 
firm’s budget constraint). So,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 Vq Sq Rq Rq Sq λλ =−+ + = +  with  () 0 V  
0 = ,  0 V′> ,  0 V′′ < ,  1 V ψλ ′′ ′′ −> + . The strictly concave objective in ( ) 1  rewrites as: 
()( )( ) () 1 WV q a q a U λ βψ λ =− + − + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .                                                              () 2  
Under complete information, the planner achieves the first best allocation  ()
* a ψ′  
* q =
 
through a fixed price contract on t (see the Appendix). No rent is left to the 
firm. Instead, under asymmetric information, the planner observes total costs and 
output but not the inefficiency parameter. The planner offers the firm a menu of 
incentive compatible pairs ( ) , tc trading off informational rent extraction and 
allocative distortion.
9 Let  ( ) ( ) { } ,,,,, , ,,,,, tq Cc Ua tqCcUa
 
denote the managers’ 
rewards, output, total and marginal costs, utility and effort of the high and low 
cost (low and high type) firms respectively. Individual rationality and incentive 
                                                 
8 Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) suggest that  A here covers a role similar to the governmental 
transfers in Laffont and Tirole (1993). Thus, my analysis is formally similar to the latter when 
reimbursement is intended to be operated through regulated prices. In the present case, the shadow 
cost of public funds is replaced by the marginal deadweight loss from a rise in the fixed fee. 
9 Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for type β  (β ) is the one preferred 
by typeβ  (β ) in the menu of managerial rewards-marginal cost pairs. This amounts to saying that: 
() () tc tc ψβ ψβ −− ≥ −−        () _ ICH         and            () () tc tc ψβ ψβ − −≥ − −.              ( ) _ ICL    10
compatibility imply a binding high cost firm’s individual rationality constraint 
( ) 0 Ut c ψβ =− − =,                                                                                     ( ) _ IRL  
and a binding low cost firm’s incentive compatibility constraint 
() () ( ) ( ) Ut cU c c a ψβ ψβ ψβ =− − = + − − − = Φ ,                                  () _ ICH  
where  () ( )( ) aaa ψ ψβ Φ≡ − − ∆  with  0 ′ Φ > , 0 ′′ Φ > (because  0 ψ ′′′ > ). 
Thus, under asymmetric information, expected social welfare is W =   
()() ()() () ( ) ()( ) ( ) () 11 1 vVq aq a a v Vq aq a λβ ψ λ λβ ψ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −+ − + − Φ +− −+ − + ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
.             () 3  
Except for the expected rent  ( ) va λΦ , the optimization is the same as in () 2 . Prices 
are not distorted for rent extraction, and incentive concerns are entirely taken care 
of by the incentive scheme. Define  ( ) ( ) 1 x xx Γ ≡−  with  0 ′ Γ > . In order to limit the 
high type’s rent, the low type receives a low powered rule (
* ˆ aa < ): 






′′ =− Γ Φ
+
.                                                                             () 4  
The supervision technology.––Let me now introduce two supervisors (a regulator 
and a judge) who, exerting costly effort, produce two independent signals that are 
observed by the planner.
10 The signals’ precision is  l ξ  with  { } , lR J = . If β β = , 
with probability  l ξ  the planner sees  β   and implements the full information 
contract and with probability 1 l ξ −  she observes φ (i.e., she remains uninformed). 
If, instead, β β =  the planner observes φ always. The planner always assures a 
reservation utility r to the two supervisors, who always participate in the game 
                                                 
10 The set up is justified, in the case of the US electricity market, by the nature of the evidence 
processing (which is de facto devolved upon the staff) and the extent of judicial review (de novo 
hearings). The contractability of the precision will lead to the first best but “does not even come 
close to any observed institutional arrangement” (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007).   11
and are not allowed to side contract with each other. The regulator moves first. If 
the planner remains uninformed, the judge generates an orthogonal signal with the 
same structure. Supervisors are evaluated on the observable but not contractible 
l ξ , whose technology is multiplicative in the random (common) ability  [ ] 0,1 α∈  
and in the unobservable effort  [ ] 0,1 l e ∈ : that is,  ll e ξ α = .
11 
The parameter α  is drawn from a distribution with mean α , variance 
2
α σ  
and density  f  independent of  l e . In order to narrow down the possible cases, I 
shall focus on the class of canonical, non degenerate, continuous distributions 
supported on a bounded interval and with hump-shaped density: that is, Beta, 
generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, inverted U-quadratic, and truncated 
normal (see Johnson et al., 1994). Moreover, I shall assume that: 
A1: When  f  is truncated normal  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 2 αα α σ ασ α σ π ⎡⎤ Φ− − Φ − < ⎣⎦ , where 
Φ  is the standard normal cumulative function.  
The assumption assures that, for all the distribution in the class, the 
density  f  is not too flat at the mean, and, in particular, that  ( ) 1 f α > . As a result, 
the marginal probability of drawing a supervisor with less than average talent is 
not too low. In the most sensible case, in which there are not extreme types and 
() () 01 0 ff == —Beta, generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, and inverted U-
quadratic—the requirement is always met (proofs available from the author). 
When, instead, this is not the case (truncated normal) the regularity on the 
                                                 
11 The effort has to be considered correctly as net of all the activities intended to hide valuable 
information. A multiplicative technology avoids the tiresome qualifications that an additive one 
needs: the choice, however, is immaterial. If the performance is any continuous and increasing 
function of the precision (e.g., expected social welfare), all the results remain unaffected.   12
measure of completely skilled and unskilled types, contained in A1, is required.
12  
Nevertheless, this last assumption has to be considered as an essentially mild one 
given the high complexity and the fast changing nature of the regulation task. 
Supervisors’ objective functions.––As suggested by Maskin and Tirole (2004), I 
suppose that supervisors respond to both implicit incentives and intrinsic 
motivations: they not only value being in office for its own sake but they also 
wish to leave a legacy. In other words, not only being reappointed or re-elected 
brings valuable perquisites or satisfies tastes for influence (implicit incentives), 
but supervisors want to be remembered for great things they have accomplished 
in favor of the society at large, or of a part of it (intrinsic motivations).  
Thus, I posit that a supervisor’s utility depends on both her identity (being 
a regulator or a judge) and the degree of accountability to which she is subjected 
(being elected or appointed). Therefore, a generic supervisor’s interim (relative to 
the moment in which she exerts effort) utility function writes as 
( ) () ( ) () ( )() ( ) { } ,, , , ,1 1 1 1 1
i
il il il il ReS S R G e S J K C e r ⎡⎤ =+ − −−− − ⎣⎦
 ,                              () 5  
where  { } , iA E =  indexes the appointment rule to which she is subjected.  () 0,1 K ∈  
is an efficiency of the information gathering technology parameter and the effort 
cost function has  () 00 C =  , 0 C′ >  , ( ) 0 C′ < ∞  , 0 C′′ >  ,  ( )
, 1, lim
il ei l Ce → ′ =∞  . The term 
in square brackets represents the non-monetary bonus obtained over and above r. 
Besides, the shape of the implicit rewards function  ( )
i G ⋅  differentiates appointed 
from elected officials and S  distinguishes regulators from judges. In particular, S  
is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge. In order to grasp a deeper 
                                                 
12 Some non-continuous distributions in the same class (for example, triangular) have the same 
property. To be hump-shaped, the Beta and Kumaraswamy need to have parameters greater than 1.   13
understanding of nonmonetary incentives, I shall leave aside signalling and 
money-burning incentives and assume that supervisors select effort before 
knowing their random ability. Then, nature chooses α . Next, the outcomes are 
observed. Finally, supervisors obtain the nonmonetary rewards inclusive utility.  
For what concerns implicit incentives, I embrace the distinction between 
politicians and bureaucrats proposed in Alesina and Tabellini (2007): while 
elected officials are held accountable by voters, at election time, appointed ones 
are accountable to their professional peers or to the society for the way that they 
fulfil the goals of their organization. In particular, the latter want to maximize the 
conditional perception of their ability. Therefore, if  [ ] E ⋅  denotes the supervisor’s 
unconditional expectation over  , Al ξ ,  E the evaluator’s expectation over α 
conditional on  , Al ξ  and the (correct in equilibrium) evaluator’s expectation over 
effort 
exp




Al Al Al Ge E e αξ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
. Turning to voters, they realize that the 
alternative to the incumbent is an average talented official exerting effort 
exp
, E l e . So 
the incumbent is re-elected if the realized performance is greater than  exp
,, E lE l e ξα =   or 
( ) { } { }
exp
,, , , , Pr Pr
E
El El El El El Ge e e ξξ α α ⎡⎤ =≥ = ≥ ⎣⎦
 . In order to simplify the analysis, let me 
normalize the market value of talent and the value of office holding to 1.  
Turning to intrinsic motivations,  ( ) 0,1 J ∈  and  ( ) 0,1 R∈  measure the 
“fairness” and the “revolving door” motivations. Political and legal scholars have 
assumed that judges try to make the (ex post) right decision in order to signal their 
fairness and commitment. Miceli and Coşgel (1994) envision that judges suffer a 
utility loss when overturned and gain utility when cited and Gennaioli and 
Shleifer (2008) suppose that judges want to minimize type one and two errors.   14
The disclosure of the firm’s information, instead, is less appealing for officials 
attracted by future job opportunities in the industry (see also Gormley, 1983). As 
Quirk (1981) shows, more pro-industry US federal regulators anticipate enhanced 
chances of working for regulated firms. Therefore, I assume that the judges’ cost 
of exerting effort (the regulators’ implicit rewards) decreases with J  (R). 
The timing.––The timing of the game is as follows:  
1. Society (that is, the planner, the supervisors and the firm) learns the nature of 
the regulatory environment ( { } ,, P β ββ ∈ ). Next, the firm discovers the value of β .   
2. The planner offers the firm a menu of ( ) , tc pairs. If it declines, the game ends.  
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; then, she discovers the value of α . 
Next, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best is 
implemented. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge moves.  
4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks 
the firm to report its information.  
5. The firm exerts equilibrium effort and the rewards-cost pair is implemented. 
Next, the signals precisions are revealed and each supervisor is rewarded. 
Implicit incentives build into the model a division of power structure: 
officials care about their evaluators’ moves and not about the incentive scheme 
selected by the planner. This model’s feature has three consequences. First, 
implicit incentives reduce the scope for side-contracts between the firm and the 
supervisors because the former has to reimburse nonmonetary rewards to the 
latter. Second, if the firm’s informational rent is not only a loss as it is in equation 
() 3 , supervisors’ and planner’s goals can collide. Third, the basic equilibrium can 
be easily obtained solving separately the supervisors’ effort choice and the   15
planner’s pricing scheme selection. Before looking at the details of the first two 
points, I shall illustrate the last one. 
 
3.2 Firm’s Extrinsic Incentives vs. Supervisors’ Implicit Incentives 
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The latter can be 
characterized by a tuple of equilibrium efforts (one for each possible supervisor’s 
type) and a menu of () , tc pairs contingent on the signals realizations. Proceeding 
by backward induction, the solution to the supervisors’ problem implies that: 
LEMMA:  Label the regulators’ (judges’) selection rule with i (j). Each 
supervisor’s problem has a unique and interior solution. In addition, equilibrium 
efforts 
, ˆij e  are such that, for all  f  in the class considered: (1)  , ˆ 0 iR eR i ∂∂ < ∀ , 
, ˆ 0, jJ eJ j ∂∂ > ∀  ,  , ˆ 0, il eK i l ∂ ∂> ∀ and  , ˆ 0, jl eK j l ∂ ∂> ∀; (2) under A1, 
,, ˆˆ , El Al eel >∀ .  
Point 1 underscores not only the role of a more efficient information-
gathering technology but also the effects of opposite legacy goals: the effort 
exerted by supervisors striving to please the industry (to be ex-post correct) tends 
to decrease (increase) as the congruency with original tasks fades away. Even 
more crucially, point 2 states that, whenever it is not too easy to substitute an 
incumbent supervisor for a mean-ability one (that is, when A1 holds), an elected 
supervisor panders to voters exerting more effort than would an appointed one.
13 
 Despite the different set up, the result is driven by an incentive similar to 
the pandering ones identified by Maskin and Tirole (2004). Moreover, the lemma 
confirms, under the more realistic asymmetric information hypothesis, the results 
                                                 
13 When the shape parameters equal 1, the Beta and Kumaraswamy become uniform and the 
inequality holds as equality (that is, elected and appointed supervisors exert the same effort).    16
obtained by Besley and Coate (2003).
14 At stage 2, the planner offers the firm a 
menu of transfers-marginal cost pairs that are function of the expected efforts. If 
( ) ( ) ,, , ˆˆ ˆ ,1 iR iR jJ ij e e e γα α α ≡+ − , the planner’s posterior belief on β  conditional on two 
uninformative signals is  { } ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr , 1 , 1 , vi j v i j ββ φ φ γ γ ⎡ ⎤ == − − ⎣ ⎦, and her optimum 
problem (indexed by s –that is supervision) writes as 
s W =   
() ()
( )




ss S s s vi j
vi j W vi j V q aq a a
vi j
γ
γγ λ β ψ λ
γ
⎧ ⎡⎤ − ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ +− −+ − + − Φ + ⎨ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ − ⎪ ⎩
             
                                                       




ss s s v




⎫ − ⎪ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + − + − + ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ − ⎪ ⎭
, 
where  * W  is the first best welfare obtained when at least one signal is informative. 
The planner evaluates supervisors’ monetary perks at the shadow cost of public 
funds 1 µ +  and, without loss of generality, does not value implicit incentives. All 
the novelties in the optimum problem, which has a unique and positive solution, 
are contained in the expected ex post probability of at least an informative signal 
( ) , ij γ . Again, the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost is the same as 
the full information case (that is,  ( ) ˆˆ ˆ s ss Vq c a β ′ = =− ) and the planner offers the 
high cost firm a scheme less powered than the first best and in particular: 
() () ( ) () ˆˆ ˆ 1,
1




′′ =− Γ − Φ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
.                                                    () 6  
Clearly, the hierarchical hearings structure is useful, and the allocative distortion 
                                                 
14 Focusing on normally distributed talent observable with noise, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) 
show that a sufficiently high uncertainty over talent implies patterns opposite to those in point 2. 
Yet, a similar scenario is not realistic in the present instance: regulatory policies are widely 
publicized (talent observed without noise) and supervisors’ curricula vitae are consistent one with 
the other (small dispersion of possible ability levels).   17
is partially curbed with respect the solution in ( ) 4  ( i.e., 
* ˆˆ s aa a << ). In 
particular, given that  () , ij γ  increases with  , ˆiR e ,  , ˆj J e , the following is true:  
PROPOSITION 1: (A) The power of the optimal incentive rule rises with the 
efficiency of the information-gathering technology, is increasing (decreasing) 
with the strength of judges’ (regulators’) intrinsic motivations and –under A1–  is 
greater whenever supervisors are elected. (B) Regulated rates decrease with  ˆ s a . 
The main innovation of Proposition 1 rests in underlining that supervisors’ 
implicit incentives and firm’s explicit incentives are complement.
15 The pattern 
resembles the relation between career concerns and monetary rewards in labour 
contracts proposed by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). However, in contrast to the 
latter, the present result refers to players who belong to different tiers of the 
hierarchical structure but, yet, are linked by the revelation principle and the 
division of power. When pandering incentives become more powerful–because 
election is used instead of appointment–the expected probability of informative 
signals increases, and the planner relaxes the allocative distortion offering the low 
type a more powerful contract. Fairness motivations reinforce complementarities; 
revolving door concerns limit them.  
The appeal of these results lies not only in the sensibility of the model’s 
premises which bridge task-specific organizational imperatives to the asymmetry 
in technological information but also in the realism of the consequences. Studying 
a similar environment, the new regulatory economics (Laffont and Martimort, 
                                                 
15 The assumption according to which the planner does not choose supervisors implicit incentives 
should not strike one as unreasonable given that, over the sample considered in the empirical 
section, there were only four regulatory and three judicial appointment rules reforms. Guerriero 
(2008) extends the model to a world in which the planner selects the power of implicit incentives.   18
1999; Laffont, 2000) obtains collusion-proof equilibria in which monetary perks 
equal to the firm’s expected stake are given to explicitly interested supervisors to 
avoid corruption. This pattern matches consistent evidence on regulatory reforms 
(Gormley, 1983; Ka and Teske, 2002) which has clarified the narrow role of 
capture but is completely at odds with any observed regulatory contract.
16 The 
equilibrium discussed in Proposition 1, instead, has similar collusion-proofness 
properties but builds on the observed residual rights nature of supervisors’ 
activities. The next section explains this point in detail. 
 
3.3 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribery 
Supervisors exert also effort in other tasks. I assume that a firms’ lobby 
tries to divert supervisors’ effort from information gathering to the fulfilment of a 
second task. For example, they try to avoid by-passing by non-regulated firms. 
The technology of the second task is 
,,
h
il il he α =  and its benefits are negligible for 
consumers and  , il h κ  (with  0 κ > ) for the firm. Following Alesina and Tabellini 
(2008), the planner does not foresee equilibrium capture and cannot condition her 
choice–that is, incentive schemes–on the supervisors’ collusive activities; α is 
truncated normally distributed, and the supervisors’ effort cost function is 
additive. Besides, the lobby, whose vote is irrelevant, has all the bargaining power 
and, in stage 2 commit to bribes  , il b  and/or campaign contributions  , E l n  (to elected 
supervisors only) to be paid after stage 5.  
                                                 
16 Collusion proof contracts are simply unrealistic if supervisors’ monetary rewards are evaluated 
against the firm’s stake: over the period 1980-1997, for instance, IOUs average revenues from 
retail sales were 1.94 billion dollars while the commissioners’ average salary was 59,774 dollars.   19
Both of these influence instruments are contracts contingent on the efforts 
exerted in the two tasks, but bribes are illegal and, if a supervisor accepts them, 
with probability  0 υ >  she is caught and pays a fine  0 M > . Thus, when  0 τ >  
measures the value of implicit rewards relative to illegal bribes, supervisors’ 
utility (indexed by C; that is, capture) rewrites as 
() ( ) () ( )() ( ) { } ,,, ,, , , , (,, ) 1 1 , 11 1
CCh iCh C h
il il il il il il il il ReeS S R Gee S J K C e e rb M τ υ ⎡⎤ =+ − −−− − + + − ⎣⎦
 .    
Implicit rewards are the same as in ( ) 5  when appointment is used but they differ 





E lE l E l eH n ξα =−    with  ( ) 00 H = ,  0 H′> ,  0 H′′< . The lobby’s indirect utility is 
()( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
,, ,, , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1,
Cs C h h
iR jJ iR jJ ER EJ Uv i j a E e e b b n n γκ α ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− Φ + + − + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 , 
where hats indicate equilibrium values. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
menu auction bribing game and of the lobbying game are jointly optimal for the 
organized group and the supervisor, given the evaluators’ expectations. Tedious 
algebra (proofs available from the author) shows that for τ
 
sufficiently large 
appointed supervisors never accept bribes, and that the lobby prefers to be ex-ante 
passive rather than pay bribes if the
 
firm’s stake is too narrow or legal systems 
work efficiently, that is  M υ  is large. Strong (weak) fairness (revolving door) 
motivations favor capture-free equilibria. Full-capture equilibria with positive 
campaign funds are never optimal because supervisors always lose election. Also, 
the lobby is not willing to offer campaign aids if money is not very effective in 
swaying votes, that is H′ is small. Thus, sufficiently strong implicit incentives 
and/or an inefficient corruption technology make the equilibrium in Proposition 1 
endogenously collusion-proof.
 
   20
3.4 Investment Concerns and Strategic Regulatory Reforms 
Yet, the picture painted so far is, at least, partially incomplete: it takes into 
account static dimensions of regulatory performance but it does not deal with the 
impact of incentive regulation on the firm’s investment decisions. Indeed, a sharp 
tension between rent extraction and investment inducement arises in industrial 
policies. As shown by Laffont and Tirole (1993), whether or not the planner can 
commit to reimburse investment costs, the equilibrium can envision ex post 
expropriation of sunk investments. On the one hand, this dynamic inconsistency 
optimally pushes toward more powerful schemes, on the other, it creates the risk 
that inefficiently high or low powered incentives are imposed on the firm if 
reforms are directed by political parties committed to decide in favour of their 
own constituency and subject to uncertain elections.  
In the next section, I first clarify the efficiency effect maintaining the 
planner’s benevolence, and then I consider the positive determinants of incentive 
rules allowing for planner’s special interests. In order to illustrate the point most 
clearly, I shall suppose that the planner cannot commit to reimburse investment 
expenses but correctly anticipates the firm’s moves.
17 The assumption reflects the 
lack of formal guarantee of productivity offsets typical of incentive contracts (see 
Basheda et al., 2001) and is not at all restrictive. Indeed, under commitment, 
whether or not contractibility is assumed, not only the results continue to hold but 
also a bargaining inefficiency arises (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch. 1).
  
 
                                                 
17 Even if the used and useful US doctrine constitutes a partial assurance against non-commitment, 
the assumption is the more appropriate in technologically mature and mass markets such as 
electricity, where a firm retaliation strategy could not be very damaging (Newbery, 2000, ch. 2).   21
Benevolent Planners 
Before learning β , the firm commits a monetary investment of cost  0 I ≥  
which increases the ex ante probability of being a high type to  ( )( ) 1 vI v I ζ =+ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  .
18 
A higher  I  makes it more likely that the firm is efficient. I also assume that the 
cost-reducing technology is efficient enough, exhibits decreasing returns and does 
not exclude a β  realization. This means that  ( ) 1 v ζ β ′≥∆ ,  0 ζ ′′ < ,  () limII I ζ → ′ =∞, 
()
1 Iv ζ
− == ∞ ,  ()
1 vv
− =Γ . In the investment regime (notice the index I ), the firm 
chooses  ˆ I  to maximize expected ex post rents minus investment costs: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
,
0 ˆˆ ˆ argmax 1 ,
SI
I Iv I i j a I I γ ≥ ∈− Φ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  .                                                        ( ) 7  
The firm under-invests with respect to the social optimum (see the 
Appendix) and a decrease in the power of the incentive rule depresses expected ex 
post rents. Thus, a benevolent planner should select higher-powered schemes if 
investment decisions are sufficiently relevant. Formally, I shall assume that the 
firm’s utility enters the planners’ objective function with an extra weight χ  with 
0 λ χ >>  so that expected welfare rewrites as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ()( )
,, ˆˆ 1,
SI SI Wv I v I i j a χγ = −Φ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
   
() () ˆ S Wv I   , where the dependence on the expected probability of a high type is 
made explicit. The low type’s contract is now pinned down by 
() () () () ()
,, , ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1,
1




− ′′ =− Γ − Φ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
 ,                                          
and by the first order condition to ( ) 7 . Fixed-price contracts reach efficiency but 
leave a disproportionate rent to the firm. Therefore, optimal rules trade off 
                                                 
18 Investment shortages also have a negative effect on service reliability and quality. Basheda et al. 
(2001) suggest that the restructuring-related investment uncertainties and the reduced availability 
of hydroelectric generation were two of the main causes of California’s liberalization failures.    22
between static (rent extraction) and long-run (investment inducement) concerns. 
PROPOSITION 2: The power of the optimal incentive scheme increases with the 
planners’ investment concerns χ . 
The result is similar to the one obtained by Sappington (1986), who claims 
that institutions preventing the regulator from observing the firm’s costs are 
optimal if the expropriation of investments is a real issue. Even if cost-reduction 
is undoubtedly in interest of society, quality and reliability-enhancing investments 
can affect consumers asymmetrically if only some of them are also shareholders. 
Next, I prove that incentive rules reflect this conflict if the planner is a political 
party accountable to her constituency, and re-election is uncertain. 
 
Partisan Planners 
Suppose that the incentive rule is selected in stage 2 by the incumbent 
between the pro-shareholder party R and the pro-consumer D. Next and before 
the firm eventually commits to the investment (just after stage 5), an election with 
exogenous winning probability  m x ( ) , mD R =  is held. The winner can, exerting 
effort  m ρ , ease the firm’s private-funds-seeking activity.
19 The investment fixed 
monetary cost is  0 I ≥  and its stochastic return has expected value 
π ≡ () 10 πδ π δ +− >  with  0 π π >> and  0 δ > . The firm is infinitively risk 




m aI π Φ+ ≥  ,                                                                                                      () 8  
                                                 
19 The set up matches the stylized fact that incentive regulation “can also be designed to encourage 
other goals, such as maintaining or improving service quality and encouraging certain investments 
(e.g., network modernization or energy efficiency investments)” (Basheda et al., 2001).    23
where  , mD R =   indexes the incumbent party.
20 Each party attaches to the ex-post 
participation to the investment game–constraint ( ) 8   both the common shadow 
price  11 ο +>  and a specific investment concern  m χ    capturing the party’s 
willingness to leave higher ex post rents to shareholders. Let me label 
D DR R x x ρ ρ + x ≡ . I assume the following restrictions on the exogenous parameters: 
A2:  1 RD ρ ρ >> ;  11 R D χ οθ οθ χ ≡+ − <+ + ≡ ;  0 θ > ;  x λ θ <  . 
Therefore, the incumbent maximizes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
,, 11 ,
SI S SI
mm m WW x v i j a οχ γ =+ + − − Φ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦     .  
In interpreting the foregoing, several observations should be borne in 
mind. First, the non-monetary nature of  m ρ  simplifies the analysis assuring that 
the ex post participation constraint enters the expected welfare without the 
shadow price of public funds. Second, the restriction according to which the 
winning party cannot reform incentive rules squares with the typical commitment 
period common to almost all PBR contracts (Basheda et al., 2001). Third, the fact 
that the pro-shareholder party exerts a higher investment-enhancing effort and 
dislikes less leaving an extra ex post rent to the firm is in the spirit of those 
models of electoral competition in which candidates commit to well-defined 
policies ahead of elections and then stick to them (for a review see Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000, ch. 3). Fourth, the last two restrictions in A2 assure that the other 
propositions continue to hold. All in all, the equilibrium low type’s allocation is 
                                                 





mm a ρ Φ−  . If the aid is monetary, the analysis continue to hold under the assumption that party 
R
 
dislikes more resorting to distortionary taxes in order to finance the aid (see Guerriero, 2008).   24
() () ( ) ()
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which, in turn, implies (see the Appendix) that: 
PROPOSITION 3: Under A2, the power of the optimal scheme rises with the 
incumbent grip on power  m x  and is greater if the reformer is pro-shareholder.   
While the second part of Proposition 3 is in tune with Laffont (1996), the 
first one differs from the conclusion of this seminal paper. There the relation 
between the likelihood of a reform toward more powerful rules and the holding on 
power of the incumbent is negative when the reformer is pro-shareholder party 
and null otherwise. The actual pattern
 originates from both the asymmetry in the 
parties’ preferences and the uncertainty of elections and is similar to the strategic 
dynamic incentive pointed out by a long tradition of political economy (Persson 
and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Hanssen, 2004).  
This body of research claims that a lack of permanence in office can 
inspire policymakers to implement reforms either to influence political outcomes 
or to limit the actions of future incumbents.
21 In a similar way in the present 
environment, even if both parties value profit-enhancing investments, only the 
pro-shareholder one prefers investment inducement to shareholder exploitation.
22 
An increase in the probability of being re-elected and exerting more (less) effort, 
without the danger of facing a new institutional reform,  pushes party R (D) to 
                                                 
21 For instance, the reform was promoted in Maine by Republicans who had defeated Democrats a 
few years earlier. The latter won back the state after the adoption of PBR (Lee and Hill, 1995). 
22 The prediction is similar to those obtained by the Alesina and Tabellini’s (1990) analysis of 
budget deficits and by the Hanssen’s (2004) study of endogenous judicial institutions. Yet PBR 
not only limits the options of successors (as do fiscal deficits and appointed courts) but it also ties 
the incumbent’s hands later, when electoral promises need to be met.    25
select more powerful rules and so assure an even higher profit to her constituency 
(curb allocative distortion). Provided that A1 and A2 hold, and with P and β  
held constant, the above propositions can be restated as testable predictions on 
regulated prices and the likelihood of reforms toward PBR as: 
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS: The likelihood of a reform toward higher powered 
incentive rules will (1) rise if supervisors are elected, increase (decrease) with the 
strength of fairness (revolving door) motivations, (2) rise with the efficiency of the 
information-gathering technology and society’s investment concerns, (3) increase 
with the incumbent’s grip on power and if the reformer is Republican. (4) More 
powerful incentive rules will lower regulated prices. 
In what follows, I test these testable predictions, tackling first predictions 1 to 3, 
and then turning to the fourth one 
 
4.  Evidence 
Between 1982 and 2002, twenty-five US states have experimented some 
form of broadly defined PBR (a firm-by-firm breakdown is available from the 
author). This variation constitutes a perfect source for a panel analysis. I consider 
forty-six states for which data on incentive rules, rates, average costs and proxies 
for the determinants of incentive rules are available (see the Appendix). From 
1996, a wide deregulation and competition-enhancing process which came into 
force with either one or two years lag, has interested the market. Clearly, such a 
restructuring wave has dramatically altered the strategic environment (see, for a 
theoretical explanation, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch. 17). An inference unable to 
disentangle the fine details of the reforms can be highly misleading. So, I consider   26
the 1982-1997 period only.
23 During these years, three alternatives to cost of 
service have been used: price cap, earnings sharing and rate case moratoria. While 
the latter constitute agreements to freeze the firm’s rates during a commitment 
period, earnings sharing requires the firm to share incremental earnings above and 
below an intermediate range with its users. When earnings are in between these 
bounds, the firm secures for herself greater profit only if a higher cost-reducement 
effort is exerted. Finally, under price cap the firm acts as residual claimant of its 
performance and can adjust its rates as long as, on average, prices rise no faster 
than inflation less a productivity offset. Thus, price cap is the most powerful rule, 
cost of service the least powerful and the others lie in between the two extremes.  
 
4.1 Non Random Incentive Rules Selection 
Once a comparable sample of institutions that vary in their effects on 
incentive power has been identified, to evaluate the model’s predictions, proxies 
for both the determinants of incentive rules and a suitable strategy are needed. In 
order to fully exploit the three-dimensional variation (over time, across states and 
across power levels) in incentive schemes, I estimate two models. Both models 
aim at explaining the probability of reforms toward more powerful rules.  
Empirical strategy.––The first model is the following ordered logit: 
, it yk =  if 
*
1, ki t k y τ τ − ≤<  for 
*
, i t it it yz β ε ′ =+  and  1, 2 k = ,  
which can be expressed in terms of the conditional distribution of  , it y  given  it z  as 
() () ( ) ,, 1 Pr it it k i t k i t yk z z z τβ τ β − ′′ == Λ − − Λ −, 
                                                 
23 Adding restructuring dummies or considering a sample with one or two more (less) years does 
not affect the empirical results in any appreciable way.   27
where  k τ   are the unknown threshold parameters, Λ  is the logit function and 
, it y (PBR_O hereafter) equals one if state i uses cost of service regulation in year  
t, three if it uses price cap and two if it uses one of the other two procedures.
24
 
The second model is the following exponential proportional hazard rate model: 
() ( ) ,e x p it it t tz z λ βλ ′ =   
where  t λ 
 is the baseline hazard and  ( ) , it tz λ  is the instantaneous probability of 
reforming from cost of service to PBR in year t and state i (that is, the failure 
event is identified by PBR, which is equal to 1 if at least one firm in the state i 
adopts price cap, rate case moratoria or earnings sharing).
25  it z   collects the 
(eventually)
26 time-varying proxies for the efficiency of the information-gathering 
technology, society’s investment concerns, the strength of supervisors’ implicit 
incentives and intrinsic motivations, and the incumbent’s grip on power. 
Measuring the structural determinants of incentive rules.––Let me start from the 
first prediction. Supervisors’ implicit incentives can be summarized by an elected 
regulators (Reg_Elec) dummy and an elected judges (Jud_Elec) binary. I also 
consider whether appointed commissioners cannot all be from the same party 
                                                 
24 The nonlinearity of the right hand side of ( ) 9  does not exclude a role for interacted regressors. If 
I estimate a logit model with dependent PBR and interaction terms, these are usually not 
significant at a probability of the reform level of  0 and 0.5 (see Ai and Norton, 2003).  
25 If I use the single IOUs within a state as the cross sectional identifiers, none of the results is 
affected. Similarly, switching to an ordered probit, imposing a different duration distribution or 
running a logit (or probit) model with dependent variable PBR does not change the main message. 
26 The embraced empirical strategy is also driven by the lack of within variation in many controls; 
yet, the coefficients attached to the time-varying covariates are qualitatively similar when a fixed 
effects logit is run. Finally, clustering the standard errors does not affect the analysis significantly.   28
(Bipartisan). The latter proxies for a less relevant Besley and Coate’s (2003) 
bundling effect, being linked to less pro-shareholder appointed regulators.
27 Thus, 
Bipartisan should display a sign similar to Reg_Elec. A more challenging task is 
to find meaningful proxies for intrinsic motivations. I follow Teske et al. (2004, 
ch.4) and use, as a proxy for revolving door motivations, a binary variable equal 
to one if the PUC imposes restrictions on how long, after service, a commissioner 
must wait before taking a job in the industry (Rev_Door). Rev_Door can proxy 
for weaker or stronger pro-industry motivations depending on whether the loss of 
attractiveness of future job opportunities dominates the incentive to implement 
more biased and everlasting decisions to signal a revolving door interest or the 
opposite is true.
28 Concerning fairness motivations, a wide literature on judicial 
independence (see Hanssen, 2004) claims that a longer length of the judicial term 
should assure more insulation diluting reputational concerns. Thus, the length of 
judicial term (Jud_Term) should proxy for less powerful fairness motivations.  
Focusing on the second prediction, it is reasonable to assume that more 
abundant resources and more powerful consumer groups ease information 
gathering. So I add to the other controls the total budget (in thousands of dollars) 
available to the PUC’s staff (Budget). I also add a proxy for the power of the 
industrial users’ watchdog group. The latter is the share of revenues from sales to 
industrial customers (Industrial). However, the utilities themselves fight in the 
                                                 
27 Besley and Coate (2003) prove that, because regulation is bundled with more salient policies, 
politicians have electoral incentives (and no costs) to appoint pro-shareholders regulators.  
28 Similar crowding effects have been widely documented in environments where implicit and 
intrinsic motivations interact: Bénabou and Tirole (2006) provide a first full-fledged theory. I 
thank David Ulph for drawing my attention to this particular point.   29
regulatory arena. Following Steiner (2004), a reasonable proxy for the industry 
influence is the share of generation from nuclear sources (Gen_Nucl). Indeed, 
nuclear plants require a large investment, which is typically undertaken by huge 
utilities: thus, the nuclear share is correlated with the influence of large producers. 
I also need proxies for society’s investment concerns. Here, my strategy is to 
assume that higher residential rates increase society’s interest in cost-reducing 
investments (for a similar approach see Steiner, 2004). Accordingly, I include the 
residential price––defined in terms of revenue (in cents per Kwh) from electricity 
sales––lagged two periods (Price_R(-2)). A proxy for the reformer’s constituency 
ideology is required as well. A broad consensus (see Ka and Teske, 2002 and 
Teske et al., 2004) holds that the Republican Party has been supported historically 
by shareholders lobbies. This suggests that a time dummy for the years in which 
both houses were under the control of the Republicans (Rep) can be used to 
control for more pro-shareholders sentiments of the incumbent.  
Turning to the third prediction, I follow Hanssen (2004), and I employ the 
share of seats held by the majority party averaged across upper and lower houses 
(Majority) as a proxy for how strong the incumbent’s hold on power is.  
Finally, scholars of policy innovation (see, for example, Ka and Teske, 
2002) claim that the diffusion pattern of a new policy displays learning features: 
after one state has adopted a new policy, surrounding states are more likely to 
follow suit. So I use the share of surrounding states adopting PBR (PBR_Nei).
29 
                                                 
29 Gen_Nucl together with Industrial and Budget are conditionally independent because they are 
either set in advance or driven by the cost structure captured by Price_R(-2). Using deflated prices 
or including income per capita, population, proportion of young and old, regional dummies and 
also the mean price prevailing in neighboring states does not affect appreciably the results.   30
Table 1 reports the descriptions and summary statistics of all variables. Column 1 
(2) of Table 2 lists the estimated coefficients (marginal effects) of the ordered 
logit model. Column 3 reports the hazard ratios of the hazard rate model. 
Empirical results.––Focusing, for ease of interpretation, on the marginal effects in 
column 2, the results are consistent with the model’s predictions. Starting from 
the first, supervisors’ implicit incentives and the firm’s explicit incentives display 
strategic complementarities, and a reform from appointed to elected regulators 
implies a little more than a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a 
reform toward price cap. The commissioners’ appointment rule seems to be more 
relevant than the judicial one. The coefficient attached to Bipartisan displays the 
correct sign but it is not significant. For what concerns intrinsic motivations, the 
results are mixed. While Rev_Door is significantly correlated with PBR_O and 
the timing limits seem to enhance the revolving door boosts, the coefficient 
attached to Jud_Term has the right sign but it is not statistically significant.  
Turning to the second prediction, higher values of Budget increase both 
the ordered log-odds of adopting more powerful schemes in column 1 and the 
likelihood of a reform toward price cap. The relative coefficient is significant at 1 
percent. The behavior of Industrial is unexpected. This result could be driven by 
the fact that the watchdog groups’ special interests can deteriorate in spite of 
ameliorating the quality of the information-gathering technology. Also, Gen_Nucl 
is not relevant in explaining PBR_O: this suggests that, when implicit incentives 
and intrinsic motivations are sufficiently strong, industry’s special interests have 
no voice at the Constitutional table. Turning to the efficiency of the generation 
technology, a one-standard-deviation (2.082) increase in Price_R(-2) (whose 
coefficient is significant at 1 percent) raises the likelihood of a reform toward   31
price cap by a 1.4 percentage points. For what concerns Rep, even if the attached 
coefficient displays the correct sign the covariate is not statistically significant. 
Turning to the strategic dynamics prediction, the estimated effects suggest 
that more powerful schemes are found where the political competition is less 
tight; however, Majority is significant only at 20 percent. Finally, as expected, 
PBR_Nei increases the ordered log-odds of adopting higher powered rules. 
Column 2 of Table 2 considers as dependent variable the hazard of PBR 
adoption. Again the empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. 
This time, the commissioners’ selection rule, the PUC budget and the lagged 
residential price are the most powerful in explaining the instantaneous probability 
of a reform toward performance based regulation.
30  
All in all, observed institutions seem to reflect both efficiency and 
forward-looking concerns. This non random assignment of reforms to US states 
not only confirms the model’s ideas but also implies that the effect of incentive 
rules on performance can be assessed correctly only when these institutions are 
treated as endogenous: I perform this empirical exercise in the next section. 
 
4.2 Regulatory Performance and Endogenous Incentive Rules 
States may well self select into PBR on the bases of unobserved political 
and technological shocks affecting at the same time the cost structure and the 
                                                 
30 The reported figures are hazard ratios, and a coefficient greater than 1 implies higher odds that 
an individual in the treatment group implements the reform before an individual in the control 
group. Thus, for instance, a state selected at random from the group of states electing their PUC 
commissioners has an 80.9 percent (= 4.23/(4.23+1)) higher probability of implementing the 
reform before a state selected at random from the group of states appointing their commissioners.   32
political and social saliency of the reform. If the variation in incentive rules used 
to explain prices is related to these unexplained determinants of performance, the 
OLS estimator becomes biased.  
Empirical methodology.––In order to assess correctly the effect of PBR, I 
estimate the following dynamic panel model: 
,, 1 , , ,
ss
it i t it it it it yy P B R X η ϑθ φ ϕ ε − =++ + + +,                                                              () 10  
using the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator.  ,
s
it y  is a price in state i and 
year  t for customer class s . The classes considered are: residential (Price_R), 
commercial (Price_C) and industrial (Price_I).  ,1
s
it y −  is a lagged performance term 
and picks up the persistence in the pricing process.
31  , it X  is a vector of factors 
likely to influence regulation. They are the time-varying determinants of incentive 
regulation discussed above (Reg_Elec,  Jud_Elec,  Majority,  Budget,  Industrial, 
Gen_Nucl,  Rep), a fossil fuels costs index (c) devised by Besley and Coate 
(2003), state population (Pop), share of population aged between five and 
seventeen (Young) and sixty-five and over (Old), and state income per capita in 
dollars (GSP). Even after controlling for all these factors, some relevant 
systematic variation inevitably remains. I introduce both state ( i η ) and time ( t ϑ ) 
dummies. While the former captures time-invariant features of the regulated 
environment such as state laws and long-run differences in production systems, 
the latter pick up macro-shocks such as interest rates shocks, changes in federal 
                                                 
31 Friedman (1991) claims that past prices constitute crucial benchmarks for the PUC staff (see Ai 
and Sappington, 2002). The temporal structure implicit in the estimated model
 
is not general. The 
effects of incentive rules may not materialize until several years after implementation. Replacing 
PBR with its counterparts lagged one year produces results similar to the findings reported below.   33
policies and industry wide technological advances. PBR captures incentive rules. 
Estimating the model in difference avoid the well-know “dynamic panel bias” 
driven by the correlation between  ,1
s
it y −  and the past errors and, therefore, the de-
meaned errors  , it i ε ε −   (see, for details, Baltagi 1995, ch. 8).  I treat  ,1
s
it y −  as 
predetermined and c as endogenous: treating both as endogenous does not affect 
the main message of the estimates discussed below. Finally given that state by 
state partial autocorrelation functions suggest that these two covariates are both 
autoregressive of order one, I introduce only one lag of  ,1
s
it y −  and c  in the 
(collapsed) instruments matrix: this also helps avoiding an over-instrumentation 
failure.
32 I also add PBR_Nei as exogenous instrument. Steiner (2004) proposes 
the following justification to this exclusion restriction: while the presence of low 
prices in reforming neighbouring states could shift support for reform in state i, 
electricity rates do not adjust until the reform is implemented in state i.
33 Similar 
results are obtained when I use, instead, an indicator for the contemporaneous use 
of incentive regulation in the state telecommunications sector. Finally, I always 
apply the Windmeijer finite-sample correction to the robust standard errors in 
order to avoid downward bias (see Roodman, 2006). 
                                                 
32 The instruments count tends to explode with the number of years T , and too many moment 
conditions can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous component, and 
weakening the power of the Hansen test for overidentification restrictions. This strategy reduces 
the instrument count well below the number of cross sections which is a rule of thumb precaution 
against this “too many instruments” failure (see Roodman, 2006). 
33 The first stage equations (not reported) confirm that the instruments are correlated to the 
endogenous covariates. Besides, the F-test on the excluded instruments are generally greater than 
10: this reassures about a possible weak instrumentation (see Stock et al., 2002).    34
Empirical results.––The basic results are given in Table 3. The Arellano and 
Bond (1991) autocovariance test does not reject a zero second-order correlation in 
the differenced residuals at a level lower than 0.33, and the Hansen test does not 
reject the over-identifying restrictions at a level lower than 0.42. This reassures 
about the consistency of the estimates. Focusing on PBR, columns 1 to 3 clearly 
shows that incentive regulation had a negative (positive) but insignificant effect 
on commercial (residential and industrial) ratepayers. The result could be driven 
by the lack of a sufficiently long sample period or could just suggest that the main 
impact of incentive regulation has been on marginal costs. However, another and 
more appealing explanation suggested by the model is that many of the reforms 
were mainly implemented—as the results discussed in subsection 4.1 seems to 
suggest—to accomodate dynamic investment concerns after an era of rising input 
costs and fierce consumers opposition to price adjustements. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The relevance of regulatory institutions to economic development is key, 
especially in a period of deregulation and competition enhancing reforms. Yet, the 
determinants of efficiency-enhancing contracts are essentially poorly understood: 
in this paper, I developed and tested a model of endogenous pricing rules. Given 
the technology environment and both the implicit incentives and the intrinsic 
motivations of public officials, political reformers not only consider the 
comparative advantages of different incentive schemes but they also use high 
powered rules to tie the hands of rival parties when uncertain about re-election. 
Consistent with the model’s main intuitions, the likelihood of reforms toward   35
higher powered rules has been linked to elected supervisors, institutional settings 
enhancing the fairness of judges, a stronger incumbent’s holding on power, more 
abundant regulatory resources and a more expensive electricity generation. As a 
result, my analysis delivers three pieces of advice for constitutional designers:  
1. It is crucial to assess carefully the dynamic effects of more powerful 
rules when expropriation of sunk investment is a real concern;  
2. Before calibrating the power of the firm’s explicit incentives, the 
efficiency of the information-gathering technology and the broad set of concerns 
to which supervisors respond need to be considered attentively; and  
3. The success of regulatory regime reforms is linked to a Constitutional 
table insulated from short-term electoral boosts. 
Even if several states have recently tried to enhance competition, US 
electricity firms, along with other major utilities, are still regulated through 
settings similar to those studied above. Moreover, very similar institutions have 
recently been exported beyond American boundaries as an answer to the rising 
demand for a more effective judicial review and for a greater transparency of the 
regulatory process (see Newbery, 2000, ch. 2). This institutional trend makes the 
US lesson an increasingly relevant case study, especially useful for the future 





                                                 
34 As stressed by Breyer (2003) and Motta (2004), several recent antitrust cases (e.g.,  Ahlstrom 
versus European Commission, 1993 and Enel versus Wind-Infostrada, 2002) have focused the 
interest of several European countries on the “gate-keeper” role of administrative judges.   36
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Equilibrium under Perfect Information 
Under perfect information, the planner knowsβ  and infers a from the observation of c. 
Maximizing () 2  with respect to a, U  and q, the first best prescribes that: 
1. The disutility of effort is equalized to the cost reduction at the margin: 
      ( )
** aq ψ′ = ;                                                                                                          ( ) 1 A  
2. Given the existence of the shadow cost of rewards, no rent is left to the firm: 
            0 U =                                  or                    ( )
** ta ψ ≡ ; 
3. The social marginal value of output and its marginal cost are equalized:  
      ( ) ( )( )
** 1 Vq a λβ ′ =+ −                 or              ( )
** Sq p c ′ = = .       
A fixed price contract on the managerial reward t gives the firm the right incentives for 
cost reduction. Label  ()
* Ta ψ ≡
 
and  ( )
** * Ca q β ≡− , equilibrium managerial rewards are 
( ) ( ) ( )
** * tC T C q C =− − . The planner tailors the fixed charge T  to fully extract the firm’s 
rent, and the firm, which is left as the residual claimant of its cost savings, 
maximizes 
( ) ( ) ( )
* Ta q C a βψ −−−−  and, consequently, chooses the optimal a.                               ■ 
Proof of Lemma 
I shall start from the equilibrium efforts prevailing when supervisors are elected. To this 
extent, maximizing  ( ) ,, , El El ReS  with respect to  , E l e  with 
exp
, E l e  taken as given and, then, 
imposing the equilibrium condition 
exp
,, ˆE lE l ee = , the equilibrium is implicitly defined by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,, , ˆˆ ˆ 11 1 1 0 El El El LHS e SR f e S J K C e αα ′ ≡− −−− − ≤                                         () 2 A         
and by the slackness () ( ) ,, ˆˆ 10 El El eL H S e −=  and  ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 El El eL H S e = . In the  ( ) { } ,,, ˆ ,, El El El eReS  
space, the first term in  () , ˆE l LHS e  is a rectangular hyperbola centred on () 0,0  while the 
second term is an increasing function. This, along with the fact that  () 0 C′ <∞   and     41
()
, 1, lim
il ei l Ce → ′ =∞  , assures that 
, ˆE l e  exists and is both interior and unique. Turning to 
appointed supervisors and following the treatment in Dewatripont et al. (1999), 
equilibrium efforts are implicitly defined by the following first order condition  
() () ()() ( )() ( )
, ,, ,, , ˆˆ ˆ 1E 1 1 1
Al e A lA l A lA l A l SR f e f e S J K C e αξ ξ ⎡⎤ ′ −≤ − − − ⎣⎦
 .                                 ( ) 3 A  
Again () 3 A  holds as an equality (and thus the slackness conditions are always met). The 
marginal density of the observable conditional on effort  ( ) ,, ˆ Al Al f e ξ  is proportional to  
() ()
2 2 exp
,, , exp 2 Al Al Al ee α ξα σ ⎡⎤ −− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 if  f  is the truncated normal and equal to  () , ˆAl ef α  if  f  is 
one of the other distributions in the relevant class. Therefore, from the equilibrium 
condition   exp
,, ˆAl Al ee = , it follows that  ( ) ( )
, ,, ,, , ˆˆ ˆ E
Al eA l A l A l A l A l f ef e e αξ ξ α ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
 and () 3 A  rewrites as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ 11 1 1 Al Al SR e S J K C e α ′ −= − − −  .                                                                    ( ) 4 A  
( ) 2 A  and ( ) 4 A  clarify that: 1. Elected supervisors exert strictly greater effort than 
appointed ones if  ()1 f α >  (which is always true under A1); 2. Supervisors’ objective 
functions are strictly concave and the following three global comparative statics apply: 
, ˆ 0 iR eR ∂∂ < , , ˆ 0, jJ eJ j ∂∂ > ∀ , ,, ˆˆ 0, 0 , , il jl eK eK i j l ∂∂ > ∂∂ > ∀ .                                              ■ 
Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit 
The socially optimal I  minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs 
() ( ) () ( ) { }
*
0 argmin 1 1 1 I I I vI vI ζ βζ β ≥ ⎡⎤ ∈+ + + − + ⎣⎦ .                                                          () 5 A  
This amounts to saying that the objective in ( ) 5 A  assumes a value greater at  ˆ I  than at  
* I ; the same can be said for the objective function in ( ) 7 . As a result, it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )
, ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 11 1 ,
SI I vI vI i j a I I βζ βζ γ +− + ∆ + + − Φ − ≥ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   
() () () () () ( ) ( )
** * , * ˆ ˆ 11 1 ,
SI IvI vI i j a I I βζβζ γ +− + ∆ + + − Φ −⇒ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
( ) () ( ) () ( ) ( ) { }
*, ˆˆ ˆ 1, 0
SI vI I i j aI ζζ βγ −∆ − − Φ ≥ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .                                                                 () 6 A     42
Given that  ( ) 1 v ζ β ′≥∆ ,  0 ζ ′′ <  and  ( ) limII I ζ → ′ = ∞, the solutions to ( ) 5 A  and ( ) 7  are 
interior (so that the slackness conditions are always met) and such that 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,* ˆˆ ˆ 1, 1 1
SI i j aI vI vI γζ β ζ ′′ −Φ = ≤ ∆ = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ;                                                     () 7 A  
where I have imposed the first order conditions and used, once again, the fact that 
( ) 1 v ζ β ′≥∆ . Clearly () 7 A  implies that  ( ) ( )
** ˆˆ I II I ζζ ′′ ≤ ⇔≥   (by the concavity of the 
ζ  function). Withal, also () 6 A  is met.                                                                          ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Applying the implicit function theorem to ( ) 9  it follows that  , ˆ 0
SI
mm a χ ∂ ∂<   (which 
proves the second part of Proposition 3 being  11 RD χ οθ χ οθ = +−< = ++) and that 
{ } () { }
, ˆ 1
SI
mm m m sign a x sign x x οχ ∂∂ = ∂ + − ∂     .      
As a result, the following two derivatives conclude the proof: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0 RR R D D R DD xx xx οχ θ ρ ρ θ ρ ρ οχ ∂+ − ∂ = − = − − = ∂+ − ∂ >  .            ■ 
 
Data 
The data set gathers observations for 46 states over the period 1980-1997. Only a few 
data points are available for the District of Columbia and no data on PBR are available 
for Alaska, Utah and Wyoming. No major IOUs serves Nebraska. Variables sources are: 
1. Data on incentive schemes are collected directly from: A. Basheda et al. (2001); B. 
EEI. Performance Based Regulation: EEI Member Survey, mimeo, EEI, 2000.  
2. Data on sales, revenue, generation shares and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per 
net Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook: 
A. EEI. 1960 – 1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry. Washington, 
DC: EEI, 1995.  
B. EEI, (1993-1997). Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry. Washington, 
DC: EEI.   43
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA, 
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and 
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Residential, commercial and industrial users 
account for the 95 percent of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of 
energy for generation in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the 
generator and by energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the 
second one, except for generation by hydro (see also Besley and Coate, 2003). Prices are 
calculated from the revenues and sales in terms of cents per Kwh.   
3. Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks: 
CSG, (1982-1997). The Book of the States. CSG, Lexington, KY. 
4. Data on regulatory selection rules, revolving door restrictions on commissioners, 
bipartisanship requirements, and total budget are collected from: A. PUCs’ web pages;  
B. NARUC, (1982-1997). Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies. NARUC, Washington DC. 
5. Data on judicial selection rules and length terms are collected from: 
A. Hanssen, F. A. “Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the 
State Courts.” Journal of Legal Studies, 33 (2004): 431-474, table 1. 
B. Besley, T., and Payne, A. “Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does 
Judicial Selection Matter?” Working Papers, LSE, 2005, table 1.  
6. In order to construct the fossil fuel cost index, let  ijt s  and  ijt q  be, respectively, the share 
and price of input  j (coal, gas and oil) used in state i and year t. So, if 
it ijt ijt it j pq p q ≡∑  
is the average price of fossil fuels (composite) per net Kwh for state i in year t, then the 
cost index is defined as  it it it cs p = .  
7. State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5–17 
are calculated from a US Census Bureau (UCB) publication: 
UCB, (1980-1997). Population Estimates Program. Washington, DC: UCB. 
8. State income per capita is collected directly from a UCB publication: 




Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions 
      










PBR_O:  Dummy taking value 3 if in the state a price cap contract is in use; 1 if 






Reg_Elec:  Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected; 0 otherwise.  0.217 
[0.413] 
Bipartisan:  Dummy taking value 1 if appointed commissioners cannot all be from 
the same party; 0 otherwise. 
0.217 
[0.413] 





Rev_Door:  Dummy equal 1 if there is a time restriction on commissioners working 
for the regulated industry once they have left the PUC; 0 otherwise. 
0.652 
[0.477] 
Jud_Term:  Length of High Court judges’ term in years.  8.761 
[3.082] 
Political 
competition:  Majority:  Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by 





Budget:  PUC’s total receipts in thousands of dollars.  18382.94 
[34828.78] 
Industrial:  Percentage of revenue from sales to customers that are industrial.  0.292 
[0.087] 
Interest 
groups:  Gen_Nucl:  Percentage of total generation from nuclear sources.  0.194 
[0.211] 
Prices: 
 Price_R:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to residential users.  7.595 
[2.109] 
 Price_R(-2): Price_R   lagged two years.  7.241 
[2.082] 
 Price_C:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to commercial users.  6.897 
[1.803] 
 Price_I:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to industrial users.  4.918 
[1.526] 
Average 
costs:   c:  Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh).  1.233 
[0.940] 
Investment 
concerns:  Rep:  Dummy taking value 1 if both houses are controlled (with the absolute 





 PBR_Nei:  Share of neighbouring states using PBR.  0.075 
[0.150] 
 Pop: State  population.  5,318,228 
[5,476,011] 
 Old:  Percentage of population aged 65 and over.  0.126 
[0.017] 
 Young:  Percentage of population aged 5–17.  0.188 
[0.015] 
 GSP:  Gross state product per capita in dollars.  15975.28 




              Table 2: Non Random Incentive Schemes Selection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Dependent Variable 
  PBR_O  PBR_O = 3  PBR 
Reg_Elec      2.033 
       [0.402]*** 
 0.043 
       [0.012]*** 
4.230 
    [2.852]** 
Bipartisan                    – 0.482 
 [0.514] 












Rev_Door                    – 0.851 
                    [0.334]** 
                    – 0.010 
                      [0.005]** 
0.908 
[0.557] 
Jud_Term                    – 0.060 
                    [0.057] 
                    – 0.0006 
                      [0.0006] 
1.049 
[0.088] 
Majority                       1.904 
                    [1.481]
† 
                       0.020 
                      [0.015]
† 
                     14.022 
                    [46.512] 
Budget      0.00002 
         [4.69e
-06]*** 
    2.38e
-07 
           [0.00000]*** 
     1.00002 
          [4.03e
-06]*** 
Industrial                    – 3.305 
                    [2.539]
† 
                    – 0.034 
                      [0.030]
† 
0.001 
  [0.004]* 
Gen_Nucl                    – 0.219 
                    [1.004] 
                    – 0.002 
                      [0.010] 
0.312 
[0.562] 
Price_R(-2)                       0.703 
      [0.128]*** 
                       0.007 
       [0.002]*** 
1.370 
    [0.217]** 
Rep                       0.035 
                   [0.354] 
                       0.0004 
                      [0.004] 
0.573 
[0.353] 
PBR_Nei                       1.360 
                    [1.038]
† 
                       0.014 
                      [0.012] 
                     18.811 
   [27.334]** 
Estimation Ordered  logit. Exponential  survival. 
Log Likelihood                      – 24.169 
Log Pseudolikelihood                                              – 187.493   
Pseudo R
2      0.24   
Number of Observations                                                          736                    692 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (z distribution) in columns (1) and (2) parentheses; standard errors in column (3) parentheses; 
            2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; 
†, 20%; 





               Table 3: Effects of PBR on Regulated Rates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Dependent Variable 
 Price_R  Price_C  Price_I 
PBR   0.163 
 [0.234] 
                    – 0.074 
 [0.159] 
                      0.115 
  [0.140] 
Other Controls      Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, Majority, Budget, Industrial, Gen_Nucl, Rep, Pop, Young, Old, GSP. 
Predetermined      Lagged dependent variable 
Endogenous      c, PBR 
Instruments (collapsed)      One lag of predetermined and of c, PBR_N 
Estimation       Fixed state and time effects difference GMM estimator. 
Instruments count                      30                       30                                        30 
Autocov. of order 2                        0.84                         0.33                        0.61 
Hansen test for 
overid. restrictions                        0.89                         0.42                        0.66 
Number of observations                     644                      644                    644 
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses; 
            2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; 
†, 20%. 
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